HIER 2001 Abstracts

1909. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer
A Case for Quantity Regulation
Abstract | Paper­
Contrary to the standard economic advice, many regulations of financial intermediaries, as well as other regulations such as blue laws, fishing rules, zoning restrictions, or pollution controls, take the form of quantity controls rather than taxes. We argue that costs of enforcement are crucial to understanding these choices. When violations of quantity regulations are cheaper to discover than failures to pay taxes, the former can emerge as the optimal instrument for the government, even when it is less attractive in the absence of enforcement costs. This analysis is especially relevant to situations where private enforcement of regulations is crucial.

1910. George-Marios Angeletos and Laurent E. Calvet
Incomplete Markets, Growth, and the Business Cycle
Abstract | Paper
We introduce a Ramsey growth model with incomplete markets, decentralized production, and idiosyncratic technological risk. The combination of uninsurable shocks with the precautionary motive can slow down capital accumulation or give rise to persistent fluctuations even when agents are very patient and technology is strictly convex. The model generates closed-form expressions for the equilibrium dynamics under a finite or infinite horizon. Multiple steady states and poverty traps can arise from the endogeneity of the interest rate instead of the usual wealth effect. Depending on the economy's parameters, the local dynamics around a steady state are locally unique, totally unstable or locally undetermined, and the equilibrium path can be attracted to a limit cycle. In calibrated examples, financial incompleteness substantially slows down convergence to the steady state and thus increases the persistence of aggregate shocks.

1911. Dale W. Jorgenson
Information Technology and the U.S. Economy
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No Abstract Available

1912. Edward L. Glaeser and Matthew E. Kahn
Decentralized Employment and the Transformation of the American City
Abstract | Paper
This paper examines the decentralization of employment using zip code data on employment by industry. Most American cities are decentralized--on average less than 16 percent of employment in metropolitan areas is within a three mile radius of the city center. In decentralized cities, the classic stylized facts of urban economics (i.e.prices fall with distance to the city center, commute time rise with distance and poverty falls with distance)no longer hold. Decentralization is most common in manufacturing and least common in services. The human capital level of an industry predicts its centralization, but the dominant factor explaining decentralization is the residential preferences of workers. Political borders also impact employment density which suggests that local government policies significantly influence the location of industry.

1913. Bruce Sacerdote and Edward L. Glaeser
Education and Religion
Abstract | Paper
In the United States, religious attendance rises sharply with education across individuals, but religious attendance declines sharply with education across denominations. This puzzle is explained if education both increases the returns to social connection and reduces the extent of religious belief. The positive effect of education on sociability explains the positive education-religion relationship. The negative effect of education on religious belief causes more educated individuals to sort into less fervent religions, which explains the negative reelationship between education and religion across denominations. Cross-country differences in the impact of education on religious belief can explain the large cross-country variation in the education-religion connection. These cross-country differences in the education-belief relationship can be explained by political factors (such as communism) which lead some countries to use state-controlled education to discredit religion.

1914. Edward L. Glaeser and Jose A. Scheinkman
Non-Market Interactions
Abstract | Paper
A large body of recent research argues that social, or non-market, interactions can explain a wide range of puzzling phenomena from fashion cycles to stock market crashes. This paper attempts to connect the range of these papers with a general model and a broad empirical overview. We establish conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria in social interactions models. The existence of multiple equilibria requires sufficient non-linearity in social interactions and only moderate heterogeneity across agents--strategic complementarities are neither necessary nor sufficient for multiple equilibria. We establish conditions for the existence of a social multiplier, which is the ratio of the aggregate outcome-input relationship to the individual outcome-input relationship. Models with multiple equilibria are empirically indistinguishable from models with significant social multipliers. Finally, we show the formal relationship between three known methods of empirically estimating social interactions, and suggests the plusses and minuses of these three approaches.

1915. Edward L. Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote
The Social Consequences of Housing
Abstract | Paper
The Social capital literature documents a connection between social connection and economic outcomes of interest ranging from government quality to economic growth. Popular authors suggest that housing and architecture are important determinants of social connection. This paper examines the connection between housing structure and social connection. We find that residents of large apartment buildings are more likely to be socially connected with their neighbors, perhaps because the distance between neighbors is lower in apartment buildings. Apartment residents are less involved in local politics, presumably because they are less connected with the public infrastructure and space that surrounds them. Street crime (robbery, auto theft) is also more common around big apartment buildings and we believe that this also occurs because of there is less connection between people in apartments and the streets that surround them.

1916. Edward L. Glaeser, David Laibson and Bruce Sacerdote
The Economic Approach to Social Capital
Abstract | Paper
To identify the determinants of social capital formation, it is necessary to understand the social capital investment decision of individuals. Individual social capital should then be aggregated to measure the social capital of a community. This paper assembles the evidence that supports the individual-based model of social capital formation, including seven facts: (l) the relationship between social capital and age is first increasing and then decreasing, (2) social capital declines with expected mobility, (3) social capital investment is higher in occupations with greater returns to social skills, (4) social capital is higher among homeowners, (5) social connections fall sharply with physical distance, (6) people who invest in human capital also invest in social capital, and (7) social capital appears to have interpersonal complementarities.

1917. David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser and Karen E. Norberg
Explaining the Rise in Youth Suicide
Abstract | Paper
Suicide rates among youths aged 15-24 have tripled in the past half-century, even as rates for adults and the elderly have declined. And for every youth suicide completion, there are nearly 400 suicide attempts. This paper examines the dynamics of youth suicide attempts and completions, and reaches three conclusions. First, we suggest that many suicide attempts by youths can be viewed as a strategic action on the part of the youth to resolve conflicts within oneself or with others. Youths have little direct economic or familial power, and in such a situation, self-injury can be used to signal distress or to encourage a response by others. Second, we present evidence for contagion effects. Youths who have a friend or family members who attempts or commits suicide are more likely to attempt or commit suicide themselves. Finally, we show that to the extent we can explain the rise in youth suicide over time, the most important explanatory variable is the increased share of youths living in homes with a divorced parent. The divorce rate is more important for suicides than either the share of children living with step-parents or the share of female-headed households

1918. Michael Schwarz and Konstantin Sonin
The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions
Abstract | Paper
This paper introduces and formally models the variable value environment and proposes an auction mechanism appropriate for it. In the variable value environment, bidders’ private values may change over time as a result of both private actions and exogenous shocks. Examples of private actions and exogenous shocks are complementary investments and exogenous changes in bidder's business, respectively. We consider a three-period model of the variable value environment where agents receive signals about their values in the first and the third periods and in the second period they take actions. This setting captures essential features of auctions of objects available for use at a future date (e.g., a sale of a military base scheduled to close in a few years). We study mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations, i.e. those in which the final value of the object to the winning bidder net of the total cost of private actions undertaken by all agents is maximized. We characterize the first best allocation, and propose a mechanism that yields the first best allocation in equilibrium. This mechanism has an inefficient pooling equilibrium along with an efficient separating equilibrium. To rule out the pooling equilibrium, we introduce a class of e -efficient mechanisms that force players to coordinate on the separating equilibrium. We prove that one can always choose an e -efficient mechanism that yields an efficient allocation with probability arbitrarily close to one.

1919. Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer
Who Owns the Media?
Abstract | Paper
We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. Government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media. Government ownership of the media is generally associated with less press freedom, fewer political and economic rights, and, most conspicuously, inferior social outcomes in the areas of education and health. It does not appear that adverse consequences of government ownership of the media are restricted solely to the instances of government monopoly.

1920. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer
Legal Origins
Abstract | Paper
A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of law enforcers from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The higher the risk of coercion, the greater the need for protection and control of law enforcers by the state. This perspective explains why, in the 12th and 13th centuries, the relatively more peaceful England developed trials by jury, while the less peaceful France relied on state-employed judges for both collecting evidence and making decisions. Despite considerable legal evolution, these initial design choices have persisted for centuries (largely because France remained less peaceful than England), and may explain many differences between common and civil law traditions with respect to both the structure of legal systems and the observed social and economic outcomes.

1921. Laurence Ball and N. Gregory Mankiw
Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design
Abstract | Paper
This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-generations economy. It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" could share risk with one another through complete Arrow-Debreu contingent-claims markets. The paper then examines how the government might implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system. One conclusion is that the system must either hold equity claims to capital or negatively index benefits to equity returns.

1922. N. Gregory Mankiw and Ricardo Reis
Sticky Information Versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Abstract | Paper
This paper examines a model of dynamic price adjustment based on the assumption that information disseminates slowly throughout the population. Compared to the commonly used sticky-price model, this sticky-information model displays three, related properties that are more consistent with accepted views about the effects of monetary policy. First, disinflations are always contractionary (although announced disinflations are less contractionary than surprise ones). Second, monetary policy shocks have their maximum impact on inflation with a substantial delay. Third, the change in inflation is positively correlated with the level of economic activity.

1923. Oliver Hart
Norms and the Theory of the Firm
Abstract | Paper
This paper discusses some of the attempts economists have made in the last ten years or so to integrate norms into the theory of the firm. The paper argues that (a) although norms are undoubtedly very important both inside and between firms, incorporating them into the theory has been very difficult and is likely to continue to be so in the near future; (b) so far norms have not added a great deal to our understanding of such issues as the determinants of firm boundaries (the "make-or-buy" decision)--that is, at this point a norm-free theory of the firm and a norm-rich theory of the firm don’t seem to have very different predictions.

1924. Oliver Hart
Financial Contracting
Abstract | Paper
This paper discusses how economists’ views of firms’ financial structure decisions have evolved from treating firms’ profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims.

1925. Edwarad L. Glaeser and Jesse Shapiro
Is There a New Urbanism? The Growth of U.S. Cities in the 1990s
Abstract | Paper
The 1990s were an unusually good decade for the largest American cities and, in particular, for the cities of the Midwest. However, fundamentally urban growth in the 1990s looked extremely similar to urban growth during the prior post-war decades. The growth of cities was determined by three large trends: (1) cities with strong human capital bases grew faster than cities without skills, (2) people moved to warmer, drier places, and (3) cities built around the automobile replaced cities that rely on public transportation. In the 1990s (as in the 1980s), more local government spending was associated with slower growth, unless that spending was on highways. We shouldn’t be surprised by the lack of change in patterns of urban growth, after all the correlation of city growth rates across decades is generally over 70 percent.

1926. Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine
Learning to Play Bayesian Games
Abstract | Paper
This paper discusses the implications of learning theory for the analysis of Bayesian games. One goal is to illuminate the issues that arise when modeling situations where players are learning about the distribution of Nature's move as well as learning about the opponents' strategies. A second goal is to argue that quite restrictive assumptions are necessary to justify the concept of Nash equilibrium without a common prior as a steady state of a learning process.

1927. N. Gregory Mankiw
U.S. Monetary Policy During the 1990s
Abstract | Paper
This paper discusses the conduct and performance of U.S. monetary policy during the 1990s, comparing it to policy during the previous several decades. It reaches four broad conclusions. First, the macroeconomic performance of the 1990s was exceptional, especially if judged by the volatility of growth, unemployment, and inflation. Second, much of the good performance was due to good luck arising from the supply-side of the economy: Food and energy prices were well behaved, and productivity growth experienced an unexpected acceleration. Third, monetary policymakers deserve some of the credit by making interest rates more responsive to inflation than was the case in previous periods. Fourth, although the 1990s can be viewed as an example of successful discretionary policy, Fed policymakers may have been engaged in "covert inflation targeting" at a rate of about 3 percent. The avoidance of an explicit policy rule, however, means that future policymakers inherit only a limited legacy.

1928. Laurent Calvet, Martin Gonzalez-Eiras, and Paolo Sodini
Financial Innovation, Market Participation and Asset Prices
Abstract | Paper
This paper proposes that the introduction of non-redundant assets can endogenously modify trader participation in financial markets, which can lead to a lower market premium and a higher interest rate. We demonstrate this mechanism in a tractable exchange economy with endogenous participation. Investors receive heterogeneous random incomes determined by a finite number of macroeconomic factors. They can freely borrow and lend, but must pay a fixed entry cost to invest in risky assets. Security prices and the participation structure are jointly determined in equilibrium. The model reconciles a number of features that have characterized financial markets in the past three decades: substantial financial innovation; a sharp increase in investor participation; improved risk management practices; an increase in interest rates; and a reduction in the risk premium.

1929. Gene D'Avolio, Efi Gildor, and Andrei Shleifer
Technology, Information Production, and Market Efficiency
Abstract | Paper
A well functioning securities market relies on the availability of accurate information, a broad base of investors who can process this information, legal protection of these investors’ rights, and a liquid secondary market unencumbered by excessive transaction costs or constraints. When these conditions are satisfied, securities markets are likely to be broader and more efficient, with felicitous consequences for investment and resource allocation. This paper explores the effect of technological advances on these features of the market, emphasizing the incentives facing the producers of financial information.

1930. Edward L. Glaeser
Public Ownership in the American City
Abstract | Paper
American local governments own and manage a wide portfolio of enterprises, including gas and electricity companies, water systems, subways, bus systems and schools. Existing theories of public ownership, including the presence of natural monopolies, can explain much of the observed municipal ownership. However, the history of America’s cities suggests that support for public ownership came from corruption then associated with private ownership of utilities and public transportation. Private firms that either buy or sell to the government will have a strong incentive to bribe government officials to get lower input prices or higher output prices. Because municipal ownership dulls the incentives of the manager and decreases the firm’s available cash, public firms may lead to less corruption. Public ownership is also predicted to create inefficiency and excessively large government payrolls.

1931.Edward L. Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko
Urban Decline and Durable Housing
Abstract | Paper
People continue to live in many big American cities, because in those cities housing costs less than new construction. While cities may lose their productive edge, their houses remain and population falls only when housing depreciates. This paper presents a simple durable housing model of urban decline with several implications which document: (1) urban growth rates are leptokurtotic— cities grow more quickly than they decline, (2) city growth rates are highly persistent, especially amount declining cities, (3) positive shocks increase population more than they increase housing prices, (4) negative shocks decrease housing prices more than they decrease population, (5) the relationship between changes in housing prices and changes in population is strongly concave, and (6) declining cities attract individuals with low levels of human capital.

1932.Edward L. Glaeser
The Economics of Location-Based Tax Incentives
Abstract | Paper
Many local governments offer rich tax deals to firms to get these firms to come to their cities. In this brief essay, I review the economics of location-based tax incentives. I first address the positive economics of these incentives and present five theories of why these tax incentives occur. I then consider the normative aspects of these incentives and discuss the conditions under which these theories lead to optimal locations of firms and to optimal bundles of public goods. In general, I argue that tax incentives will generally lead to more efficient locational decisions. There may be undesirable redistributional consequences of these incentives, but these are best handled by national redistribution policy.

1933. Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote
Why Doesn't The US Have a European-Style Welfare State?
Abstract | Paper
European countries are much more generous to the poor relative to the US level of generosity. Economic models suggest that redistribution is a function of the variance and skewness of the pre-tax income distribution, the volatility of income (perhaps because of trade shocks), the social costs of taxation and the expected income mobility of the median voter. None of these factors appear to explain the differences between the US and Europe. Instead, the differences appear to be the result of racial heterogeneity in the US and American political institutions. Racial animosity in the US makes redistribution to the poor, who are disproportionately black, unappealing to many voters. American political institutions limited the growth of a socialist party, and more generally limited the political power of the poor.

1934. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer
The Rise of the Regulatory State
Abstract | Paper
During the Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20 th century, the United States replaced litigation by regulation as the principal mechanism of social control of business. To explain why this happened, we present a model of choice of law enforcement strategy between litigation and regulation based on the idea that justice can be subverted with sufficient expenditure of resources. The model suggests that courts are more vulnerable to subversion than regulators, especially in an environment of significant inequality of wealth and political power. The switch to regulation can then be seen as an efficient response to the subversion of justice by robber barons during the Gilded Age. The model makes sense of the progressive reform agenda, and of the successes and failures of alternative law enforcement strategies in different countries.

1935. Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni and Ludger Schuknecht
What Does the European Union Do?
Abstract | Paper
We construct a set of indicators to measure the policy-making role of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc.), in a selected number of policy domains. Our goal is to examine the division of prerogatives between European institutions and national ones, in light of the implications of normative models and in relation to the preferences of European citizens. Our data conÞrm that the extent and the intensity of policy-making by the EU have increased sharply over the last 30 years. Such increase has taken place at dierent speeds, and to dierent degrees, across policy domains. In recent times the areas that have expanded most are the most remote from the EEC™s original mission of establishing a free market zone with common external trade policy. We conjecture that the resulting allocation may be partly inconsistent with normative criteria concerning the assignment of policies at different government levels, as laid out in the theoretical literature.

1936. Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara
Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities
Abstract | Paper
The poor favor redistribution and the rich oppose it, but that is not all. Social mobility may make some of today’s poor into tomorrow’s rich and since redistributive policies do not change often, individual preferences for redistribution should depend on the extent and the nature of social mobility. We estimate the determinants of preferences for redistribution using individual level data from the US, and we find that individual support for redistribution is negatively affected by social mobility. Furthermore, the impact of mobility on attitudes towards redistribution is affected by individual perceptions of fairness in the mobility process. People who believe that the American society offers equal opportunities to all are more averse to redistribution in the face of increased mobility. On the other hand, those who see the social rat race as a biased process do not see social mobility as an alternative to redistributive policies.

1937. Enrico Spolaore and Alberto Alesina
War, Peace and the Size of Countries
Abstract | Paper
This paper studies the relationship between international con‡ict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargain-ing and non-peaceful confrontations are possible. We show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood, benefits and costs of conflict and war. We also study the role of international law and show how better defined international ’property rights’ may lead to country breakup and more numerous local conflicts.

1938. Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch
Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different?
Abstract | Paper
The answer to the question posed in the title is “yes.” Using a total of 128,106 answers to a survey question about “happiness,” we find that there is a large, negative and significant effect of inequality on happiness in Europe but not in the US. There are two potential explanations. First, Europeans prefer more equal societies (inequality belongs in the utility function for Europeans but not for Americans). Second, social mobility is (or is perceived to be) higher in the US so being poor is not seen as affecting future income. We test these hypotheses by partitioning the sample across income and ideological lines. There is evidence of “inequality generated” unhappiness in the US only for a sub-group of rich leftists. In Europe inequality makes the poor unhappy, as well as the leftists. This favors the hypothesis that inequality affects European happiness because of their lower social mobility (since no preference for equality exists amongst the rich or the right). The results help explain the greater popular demand for government to fight inequality in Europe relative to the US.

1939. Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni and Federico Etro
The Political Economy of International Unions
Abstract | Paper
We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together the provision of certain public goods and policies because of spillovers. The countries are heterogeneous either in preferences and/or in economic fundamentals. The trade off between the benefits of coordination and the loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines the size, the composition and the scope of unions. Our model implies that the equilibrium size of the union is inversely related to the degree of heterogeneity between countries and to the spectrum of common policies. Hence, there is a trade off between enlargement and deepening of coordination: a union involved in too many collateral activities will be favored by few countries, while a union which focuses on a core of activities will be favored by many countries. However the political equilibrium implies a bias toward excessive centralization and small size of the union. This bias can be corrected if there is a constitutional commitment of the union to centralize only certain policies.

1940. Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni and Federico Etro
Institutional Rules for Federations
Abstract | Paper
We study the organization of federations — or international unions — which decide together the provision of certain public goods. The benefit of centralization depends on the internalization of the spillovers, that of decentralization on the adaptability to local differences. We individuate as an optimal institutional design a form of fiscal federalism based on decentralization of expenditures and a system of subsidies and transfers between countries. Since this solution can be politically unfeasible, we study institutional compromises between a centralized federation and a decentralized one. “Flexible unions” and federal mandates in which both the state and federal levels are involved in providing public goods are typically superior to complete centralization and politically feasible. Finally, we study the effects of a qualified majority voting rule in a centralized system: we find that it can be a useful device to correct a bias toward “excessive” union level activism.

1941. N. Gregory Mankiw and Ricardo Reis
Sticky Information: A Model of Monetary Nonneutrality and Structural Slumps
Abstract | Paper
This paper explores a model of wage adjustment based on the assumption that information disseminates slowly throughout the population of wage setters. This informational frictional yields interesting and plausible dynamics for employment and inflation in response to exogenous movements in monetary policy and productivity. In this model, disinflations and productivity slowdowns have a parallel effect: They both cause the path of employment to fall below the level that would prevail under full information. The model implies that, in the face of productivity change, a policy of targeting either nominal income or the nominal wage leads to more stable employment than does a policy of targeting the price of goods and services. Finally, we examine U.S. time series and find that, as the model predicts, unemployment fluctuations are associated with both inflation and productivity surprises.

1942. Edward L. Glaeser and Jesse M. Shapiro
Cities and Warfare: The Impact of Terrorism on Urban Form
Abstract | Paper
What impact will terrorism have on America’s cities? Historically, large-scale violence has impacted cities in three ways. First, concentrations of people have an advantage in defending themselves from attackers, making cities more appealing in times of violence. Second, cities often make attractive targets for violence, which creates an incentive for people to disperse. Finally, since warfare and terrorism often specifically target means of transportation, violence can increase the effective cost of transportation, which will usually increase the demand for density. Evidence on war and cities in the 20 th century suggests that the effect of wars on urban form can be large (for example, Berlin in World War II), but more commonly neither terrorism nor wars have significantly altered urban form. As such, across America the effect of terrorism on cities is likely to be small. The only exception to this is downtown New York which, absent large-scale subsidies, will probably not be fully rebuilt. Furthermore, such subsidies make little sense to us.

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