photo Harvard University - Economics Department

Drew Fudenberg

Publications

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Publications of Drew Fudenberg, Last Updated November 2009

Published Papers­­­

  1. "Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Co­mpetition in Patent Races," (with R. Gilbert, J. Stiglitz and Jean Tirole), European Economic Review, 22 (1983), 3-31.
  2. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games" (with David K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (1983), 251-268.
  3. "Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to Deter Mobility" (with Jean Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (1983), 227-250.
  4. "Learning by Doing and Market Performance" (with Jean Tirole), Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (1983), 522-530.
  5. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information" (with Jean Tirole), Review of Economics Studies, 50 (1983), 221-247.
  6. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," (with Jean Tirole), American Economic Review, 74 (1984), 361-366.
  7. "Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology," (with Jean Tirole), Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), 383-402.
  8. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," (with David K. Levine and Jean Tirole), pp. 73-98 in A. Roth, ed., Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge University Press, 1985.
  9. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," (with David K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 38 (1986), 261-279.
  10. "Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," (with Eric Maskin), Econometrica, 54 (1986), 533-554.
  11. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," (with Jean Tirole), Econometrica, 54 (1986), 943-960.
  12. "A Signal-Jamming Model of Predation," (with Jean Tirole), Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (1986), 366-376.
  13. "Incomplete-Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," (with David K. Levine and Jean Tirole), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 52 (1987), 37-50.
  14. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Uses of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," (with Jean Tirole), American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 77 (1987), 176-183.
  15. "Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents," (with David Kreps), Review of Economic Studies, 54 (1987), 541-568.
  16. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," (with David Kreps and David K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 44 (1988), 354-380.
  17. "Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria of Dynamic Games with Many Players," (with David K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 44 (1988), 1-18.
  18. "An Example of Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," (with P. Diamond), Journal of Political Economy, 97 (1989), 606-619.
  19. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Single Long-Run Player," (with David K. Levine), Econometrica, 57 (1989), 759-778.
  20. "Game Theory for Industrial Organization: Introduction and Overview," (with Jean Tirole), Ch. 5 in D. Schmalansee and R. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam/New York, 1989.
  21. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," (with Eric Maskin), American Economic Review, 80 (1990), 274-279.
  22. "Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships," (with Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom), Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), 1-32.
  23. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," (with Eric Maskin), Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), 194-206.
  24. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," (with David Kreps and Eric Maskin), Review of Economic Studies, 57(1990), 555-573.
  25. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," (with Jean Tirole), Econometrica, 58 (1990), 1279-1320.
  26. "Rational Play with Payoff Uncertainty," (with Eddie Dekel), Journal of Economic Theory, 52 (1990), 243-267.
  27. "On the Dispensability of Public Randomizations in Discounted Repeated Games," (with Eric Maskin), Journal of Economic Theory, 53 (1991), 428-438.
  28. "Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibrium," (with Jean Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 53 (1991), 236-260.
  29. "An Approximate Folk Theorem for Games with Imperfect Private Information," (with David K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 54 (1991), 26-47.
  30. "Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed," (with David K. Levine), Review of Economic Studies, 59 (1992), 561-581.
  31. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," (with C. Harris), Journal of Economic Theory, 57 (1992), 420-441.
  32. "Commitment and Cooperation in Long-Term Relationships," in J. J. Laffont, ed., Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
  33. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," (with David K. Levine), Econometrica, 61 (1993), 523- 546.
  34. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," (with David K. Levine), Econometrica, 61 (1993), 547-574.
  35. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," (with Glenn Ellison), Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 612-643.
  36. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," (with David Kreps), Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (1993) 320-367.
  37. "Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," (with David K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 62 (1994), 103-135.
  38. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information," (with David K. Levine and Eric Maskin), Econometrica, 62 (1994), 997-1039.
  39. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibria," (with David Kreps), Games and Economic Behavior, 8 (1995), 20-55.
  40. "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents," (with Jean Tirole), Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1995), 75-93.
  41. "Word of Mouth Communication and Social Learning," (with Glenn Ellison), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995), 93-126.
  42. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," (with David K. Levine), The Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19 (1995), 1065-1089.
  43. "Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent," (with M. Celentani, David K. Levine , and W. Pessendorfer), Econometrica, 64 (1996) 691-704.
  44. "Measuring Player's Losses in Experimental Games," (with David K. Levine), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1997), 479-506.
  45. "When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible," (with David K. Levine and W. Pesendorfer), Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998), 46-71.
  46. "Trade-Ins, Upgrades, and Buy-Backs," (with Jean Tirole), Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (1998), 235-258.
  47. "Learning in Games: Where Do We Stand?" (with David K. Levine), European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 631-639.
  48. "Conditional Universal Consistency," (with David K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior, 29 (1999), 104-130.
  49. "An Easier Way to Calibrate," (with David K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior, 29 (1999), 131-137.
  50. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium, " ( with Eddie Dekel and David K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 89 (1999), 165-185.
  51. "Learning Purified Equilibria," (with Glenn Ellison), Journal of Economic Theory, 90 (2000), 84-115.
  52. "The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades of Computer Software," (with Glenn Ellison), Rand Journal of Economics, 31(2000) ,253-272.
  53. "Customer Poaching and Brand Switching," (with Jean Tirole), Rand Journal of Economics, 31 (2000), 634-657.
  54. "Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good," (with Jean Tirole), Journal of Industrial Economics, 48 (2000), 373-390.
  55. "Subjective Uncertainty about Behavior Strategies: A Correction," (with Eddie Dekel and David K. Levine), Journal of Economic Theory, 104 (2002), 473-478.
  56. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?" (with Glenn Ellison), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (2003), 1249-1278.
  57. "Word-of-Mouth Learning,” (with Abhijit Banerjee), Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2004), 1-22.
  58. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," (with Eddie Dekel and David K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior, 46 (2004), 282-303.
  59. "Competing Auctions,” (with Glenn Ellison and Markus Mobius), Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (2004), 30-66.
  60. "Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations,” (with Martin Nowak, A. Sasaki, and C. Taylor), Nature, 428 (2004), 646-650.
  61. "Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations," (with Martin Nowak, A. Sasaki and C. Taylor), Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 66 (2005),1621-1644.
  62. "Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection," (with Lorens Imhof and Martin Nowak), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102 (2005), 10797-10800
  63. "Learning and Belief Based Trade," (with David K. Levine), The Latin American Journal of Economics, 42 (2005), 199-207.
  64. "Superstition and Rational Learning," (with David K. Levine), American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 630-651.
  65. "Topologies on Types," (with Eddie Dekel and Stephen Morris), Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 275-309.
  66. "Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics", Journal of Economic Literature, 44 (2006), 694-711.
  67. "Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations with Strong Selection and Weak Mutations," (with Lorens A. Imhof, Martin Nowak and C. Taylor), Theoretical Population Biology, 70 (2006), 352-363.
  68. "Imitation Processes with Small Mutations," (with Lorens A. Imhof), Journal of Economic Theory, 131 (2006), 251-262.
  69. "A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control," (with David K. Levine), American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 1449-1476.
  70. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two-Player Games," Journal of Economic Theory, 132 (2007), 461-473.
  71. "Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition," (with M. Villas-Boas), in T. Hendershott, ed., Economics and Information Systems, Vol. 1, Elsevier, Oxford, 2007.
  72. "Interim Rationalizability," (with Eddie Dekel and Stephen Morris), Theoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 15-40.
  73. "Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions," (with Markus Mobius and Adam Szeidl), Journal of Economic Theory, 133 (2007), 550-567.
  74. "An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning," (with David K. Levine), Artificial Intelligence, 171 (2007), 378-381.
  75. "Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift?" (with Lorens A. Imhof and Martin A. Nowak), Journal of Theoretical Biology, 247 (2007), 574-580.
  76. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," (with David K. Levine and S. Takahashi), Games and Economic Behavior, 61 (2007), 27-49.
  77. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," (with David K. Levine), Review of Economic Dynamics, 10 (2007), 173-192.
  78. "Winners Don't Punish," (with A. Dreber, D. Rand and Martin Nowak), Nature, 452 (2008), 348-351.
  79. "When Is Reputation Bad?" (with Jeff Ely and David K. Levine), Games and Economic Behavior, 63 (2008), 498-526.
  80. "Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations," (with Lorens A. Imhof), Journal of Economic Theory, 140 (2008), 229-245.
  81. "Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics," (with Glenn Ellison and Lorens A. Imhof), Games and Economic Behavior, 66 (2009), 98-114.
  82. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," (with David K. Levine), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (2009), 233-265.
  83. "Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation," (with David G. Rand, Anna Dreber, Tore Ellingsen and Martin A. Nowak), Science 325: 1272-1275.
  84. "Learning and Equilibrium," (with David K. Levine), Annual Review of Economics 1:  385-420.

Books and Monographs

  • Dynamic Models of Oligopoly (with Jean Tirole), Harwood Academic Publishers, 1986, 83 pp. Translated into Italian as Modelli Dinamici di Oligopolio (translated by Gianmaria Martini, edited by A. Giuffre, Testi Scelti di Economia, 1994, Milano: Italy.
  • Game Theory (with Jean Tirole), MIT Press, 1991, 579 pp. Translated into Chinesse by Renin University Press, Bejing: China.
  • The Theory of Learning in Games (with David K. Levine), MIT Press, 1998, 276 pp.
  • A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games (with David K. Levine), World Scientific Press, 2009, 391 pp.

Working Papers

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